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Abstract. This paper describes hedonic equilibrium and shows
how and why the concept has to be modiﬁed when characteristics
of traders on both sides of the market are endogenous.
1. Introduction
In the most elementary economic transaction, a buyer has to ﬁnd a
seller to ’match’ with in order to complete a transaction. We don’t or-
dinarily think much about matching in this context because the buyer
in this example only cares about a commodity and its price. He or she
cares not at all about which seller supplies it. In many problems this
isn’t the case. Though it is common to assume it away, a ﬁrm cares
intensely which worker it hires, not just about the wage it has to pay.
Marriage markets are another example in which the characteristics of
a partner mean a lot more than any transfer that is made to facilitate
a marriage. A recent and very applied literature in matching has stud-
ied other important problems. For example, the deferred acceptance
algorithm is either used or has been suggested as a way to match new
lawyers with law ﬁrms, medical residents with hospitals (Roth (2003)),
students to public schools (Abdulkadrolu and Sonmez (2003)), and stu-
dents to colleges (Gale and Shapley (1962)). A recent paper by (Roth,
Sonmez and Utku Unver (2005)) uses the methods of stable matching
to matching kidney donors and patients.
The typical approach is to assume that the characteristics of the
various partners available are ﬁxed exogenously, then to try to ﬁnd good
ways to pair them. A problem that has received less attention is what
to do when the characteristics of the traders involved in the market
are endogenous. This is a problem that is well known in practise.
For example universities use standardized testing to select applicants
for admission and decry the fact that students spend too much time
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1prepping for the admission test, and not enough time building skills
that they can use later.
For large matching markets, like the labour or marriage market,
a useful tool for thinking about this problem is hedonic equilibrium
(Rosen (1974) or Mas-Colell (1975)). The models in this literature
typically assume that characteristics on one side of the market are
ﬁxed, while the other side adapts in response. Rosen’s original paper
involves a continuum of ﬁrms of diﬀerent (but exogenously given) quali-
ties and a continuum of consumers of diﬀerent tastes who oﬀer diﬀerent
amounts of money for these. A more recent application is the paper by
Bulow and Levin (2006) that studies wages in a labour market where
the characteristics of workers are ﬁxed. This paper was a response to
an anti-trust suit ﬁled against the medical residents matching program
in 2002 claiming that it suppressed wages.
For the purposes of this paper, the interest in hedonic equilibrium
stems from a paper by Peters and Siow (2002) that made two con-
tributions. The ﬁrst was to show that there was no need to restrict
attention to problems in which only one side of the market could tai-
lor its characteristics to the matching process as Rosen had done, and
as was common in other literature. In the marriage market that they
studied both sides actively engage in investment. The second was to
show that there was no need to monetize these characteristics the way
they are, say, in the housing market where each characteristic of a house
is assigned a monetary value. Utility in the marriage market typically
isn’t transferable, so the idea that a certain physical characteristic has
a monetary value isn’t natural.
The point of this paper is to illustrate how to adapt this idea for
use with problems like the residents matching problem where there are
relatively large numbers of traders on both sides of the market, but
where the characteristics of both sides of the market are endogenous.
The adaptation is needed because there is a ﬂaw in the hedonic argu-
ment that simply isn’t apparent with one sided investment - it can’t
be supported as the limit of a sequence of non-cooperative equilibrium.
The oﬀ equilibrium payoﬀs that it uses to support overall equilibrium
aren’t credible, even approximately (for example (Peters 2004, Felli and
Roberts 2000)). We hope to show that a suitably modiﬁed version of
hedonic equilibrium can be applied to such problems.
In the transferable utility case, where every characteristic can be
assigned a money value, the hedonic approach has a nice mathematical
structure, illustrated by Ekeland (2003). His formalism extends to
problems without money. We sketch his conceptual argument here,
since it isn’t hard. Consider a marriage market where men have innate
2characteristics drawn from some distribution X, while women have
characteristics in another space Y . Depending on these characteristics,
men choose acquired characteristics from a space W, their education,
their personality, their appearance and so on. Women do the same,
choosing from the set H. Then, they arrive at the marriage market
and engage in a stable match of some kind based on the fact that
payoﬀs to a match between a man and a woman depend on the innate
and acquired types of the matched pair.
Let Z be the product of W and H. Imagine an auctioneer who,
instead of announcing a price for each characteristic, simply creates a
surface {z ∈ Z : ω (z) = 0}. Men then choose the point z = (h,w) ∈ Z
satisfying ω (z) ≤ 0 that they most prefer, with the understanding that
if they bring their part of the characteristic w to the market, then they
will match with a partner who has characteristic h. Women do the
same except that they choose z such that ω (z) ≥ 0. The choices that
men make induce a measure on the set Z, the same for women. Assume
that the mass of men and women is the same, the auctioneer adjusts ω
until the measures that each sides’ choices induce on Z are the same.
This is what market clearing means. The interpretation is not that
characteristics have money prices, but that if a man brings a certain
set of characteristics w to the market, then he will be able to accurately
predict the quality of the partner it will attract using the relationship
described by the auctioneer. Ekeland (2003) establishes the existence
of an equilibrium of this kind when preferences are quasi-linear under
otherwise very weak assumptions.
The complication for hedonic equilibrium occurs at the ’edges’ of
the market. In a labour market with assortative matching, for exam-
ple, there is a worst worker and ﬁrm who will match in equilibrium.
The worker brings some level of education, the ﬁrm a wage. If they
make a bilaterally eﬃcient investment wage decision, as competitive
equilibrium says they must, then each would like to reduce his or her
own wage or educational investment, but according to the hedonic ar-
gument, won’t do so for fears of losing their partner. Yet if the worker
and ﬁrm are truly the worst on the market, then there is no worse
partner. Small reductions in wages and investments should then have
no impact on their partner, and the hedonic solution unravels.1
This paper illustrates how to construct an equilibrium very similar to
the hedonic equilibrium using the limits of Bayesian Nash equilibrium
from ﬁnite versions of the game to determine the out of equilibrium
payoﬀs. Apart from providing an illustration of a case where large
numbers do not eliminate strategic play, the problem also nicely illus-
trates the main diﬀerence between competitive equilibrium and game
3theory - oﬀ equilibrium behavior in the competitive model is largely
arbitrary, whereas the game theoretic treatment takes pains to make
oﬀ equilibrium behavior look reasonable.
The paper begins with a description of the hedonic equilibrium with
two-sided endogeneity, articulated more or less as it was in Peters and
Siow (2002). We illustrate the diﬃculty with hedonic equilibrium, then
illustrate how the solution concept can be modiﬁed to get around the
problem. We ﬁnish by mentioning some of the implications for prob-
lems that are typically understood using hedonic ideas.
2. Fundamentals
The market consists of m ﬁrms and n workers respectively with
n > m and n = τm. Each ﬁrm has a privately known character-
istic x. If is commonly believed that these are independently drawn
from a distribution F on a closed connected interval X = [x,x] ⊂ R+.
This characteristic measures the value of worker investment to the ﬁrm.
Firms with higher types have higher marginal value for worker human
capital. Similarly, each worker has a type y that aﬀect his or her in-
vestment cost. Again it is assumed that these are independently drawn





The distributions F and G are both assumed to be diﬀerentiable, with
both densities F ′ and G′ uniformly bounded above.
When we want to think about a continuum of workers and ﬁrms, m
and n will be treated as measurable sets. The measure of the set m
will be 1 while the measure of the set n will be τ. The measures F and
G will then represent the distribution of characteristics on m and n.
Each ﬁrm has a single job that it wants to ﬁll with one worker. Each
worker wants to ﬁll one job. In order to match, ﬁrm i chooses a wage
wi ∈ W ⊂ R+. Each worker j chooses a human capital investment
hj ∈ H ⊂ R+. Workers and ﬁrms are then matched assortatively, with
the most skilled worker (the worker with the highest hj) being hired
by the ﬁrm with the highest wage, and similarly for lower wages and
investments. Ties are resolved by ﬂipping coins.
Payoﬀs for ﬁrms and workers depend on their characteristic, their
investment or wage, and on the investment or wage of the partner with
whom they are eventually matched. The payoﬀ of a ﬁrm who oﬀers
wage wi and is matched with a worker of type hj is
(1) v(xj)hj − wi
where v(xj)is a monotonically increasing function of xj. The corre-
sponding payoﬀ for a worker whose investment is hj who ﬁnds a job at
4wage wi is
(2) wi − c(hj,yj)
where c is a strictly convex diﬀerentiable function of hj, and a strictly
decreasing diﬀerentiable function of yj. It is assumed that marginal
cost is strictly decreasing in type yj. Each worker must make a min-
imal investment h∗ which we refer to as the worker’s bilateral Nash
investment since it is the investment that the worker would make in a
bilateral relationship in which the quality of his partner were certain.
It is also assumed there is a minimum wage w∗ > 0 that ﬁrms must
oﬀer, and refer to this as the bilateral Nash wage of ﬁrms.
Firms always match in this model, since they are on the short side
of the market. So a ﬁrm can always guarantee itself a payoﬀ at least
v(xi)h∗ − w∗ by oﬀering the minimum wage and matching with the
least qualiﬁed employable worker (whose investment is always at least
h∗. In this sense this payoﬀ is ﬁrm xi’s maximin payoﬀ. Similarly, a
worker has maximin payoﬀ −c(h∗,yj) since the worst that can happen
when the worker invests h∗ is that she doesn’t match. A pair (wi,hj) is
rationalizable for a worker of type yj and a ﬁrm of type xj if both the
worker and ﬁrm attain at least their maximin payoﬀ in a match with
this wage and investment. Say that a wage wi is rationalizable for a
ﬁrm of type xi if there is some type of worker yj and some investment
hj such that a match between a worker of type yj and a ﬁrm of type xi
in which investments are equal to (wi,hj) is rationalizable. Finally, a
wage is rationalizable, if it is rationalizable for some ﬁrm. We make the
following assumption about the set of feasible investments and wages.
Condition 2.1. The sets H and W are bounded intervals containing
all rationalizable investments and wages.
To help see the meaning of this restriction, consider the following
diagram:
The diagram is drawn in the space H × W which corresponds with
the space Z is the general description of hedonic equilibrium given
above. Workers have indiﬀerence curves that represent the various lev-
els of investment in human capital they would be willing to make given
diﬀerent wages in return. These indiﬀerence curves constitute a family
that resemble the convex upward sloping curve in the diagram. The in-
diﬀerence curve drawn is the one that the best worker attains when she
is unemployed. Firms have a similar family of indiﬀerence curves. They
are linear, and the one drawn corresponds with the best ﬁrms’ maximin
value, attained by oﬀering the minimum wage w∗ and matching with






that lie between these two indiﬀerence curves are rationalizable in a
match between the highest worker and ﬁrm type. Indiﬀerence curves
for lower type workers are steeper, while indiﬀerence curves for lower
ﬁrm types are ﬂatter. The maxi-min outcomes for lower type workers
and ﬁrms are the same as they are for the highest types. So the set of
wage investment pairs that are rationalizable for lower types are con-
tained within the intersection of these two indiﬀerence curves by the
single crossing property of preferences. Then the set of all rational-
izable wages and investments is contained within the rectangle whose
upper boundaries H and W are given by the intersection of these two
curves. Condition 2.1 says that this rectangle is contained in the cross
product of H and W.
3. The competitive (Hedonic) model with Two-Sided
Endogenous Types.
Let Z = W×H. In this section m and n are measurable sets. An allo-
cation is a pair of measurable mappings αf ( ) =
￿
wf ( ),hf ( )
￿
: X →




cation α is feasible if the measures it induces on Z+ = {(w′,h′) ∈ Z : w′ > 0}
are the same. This restriction requires that some workers remain un-
matched. In this formulation, unmatched workers are mapped to points
in Z/Z+. An allocation α is Pareto optimal if there does not exist an
alternative feasible allocation for which almost all workers and ﬁrms are
at least as well oﬀ, while some set of workers or ﬁrms having strictly
positive measure are made strictly better oﬀ.
6A feasible allocation α is a competitive equilibrium if there exists an
hedonic (non-linear) functional ω : H × W → R such that for every
x ∈ X,
α




′ : ω (h
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and for every y ∈ Y ,
α




′,y) : ω (h
′,w
′) ≥ 0}
As preferences are quasi-linear, the functionals can be chosen to be
linearly separable in w′ (for example, see (Ekeland 2003)).23 Then
the constraint for ﬁrms could be written w′ ≥ ω (h), which gives the
hedonic wage interpretation that is common in labour economics.
The existence of competitive equilibrium in the quasi-linear case is
studied by (Ekeland 2003). When preferences aren’t quasi-linear, but
the dimension of Z is small, suﬃcient conditions for existence are pro-
vided in (Peters and Siow 2002) and (Han 2002). When the qualities of
one side of the market are given exogenously, existence is established
(without quasi-linearity but with one indivisible commodity) by (Mas-
Colell 1978). Interest here is focused on a couple of the properties of
competitive equilibrium. First
Proposition 3.1. Suppose preferences are monotonic. Then every
competitive equilibrium is Pareto optimal.
The proof of this theorem is straightforward, and simply mimics the
textbook argument. An easy way to compare hedonic and truncated
hedonic equilibria is to use some pictures. The ﬁrst ﬁgure below de-
scribes a hedonic or fully competitive equilibrium for the worker ﬁrm
problem.
There are more workers than ﬁrms in this market, so not all the
workers can be accommodated with jobs. Let y0 be the worker type
such that the measure of the set of workers with better types is equal
to the measure of the set of ﬁrms, i.e., (1 − G(y0))τ = 1. We refer to
this worker type as the marginal worker. The hedonic (competitive)
wage function begins at the maximin point (h∗,0), then travels up the
indiﬀerence curve of the marginal worker to the point e, where this
marginal worker’s indiﬀerence curve is tangent to an indiﬀerence curve
of the worst type ﬁrm (given by the line segment FF in the ﬁgure). The
marginal worker is that worker whose type is such that the measure of
the set of workers with higher types is equal to the measure of the set
of ﬁrms. Workers whose types are below that of the marginal type will
make their bilateral Nash investments and remain unmatched. The











Figure 1. Hedonic Equilibrium
hedonic wage then moves up in such a way that successively higher type
workers and ﬁrms indiﬀerence are tangent to one another. The dashed
indiﬀerence curve F ′F ′ represents an indiﬀerence curve for a higher
type ﬁrm. This indiﬀerence curve is steeper than the indiﬀerence curve
through FF because the higher type ﬁrm has a higher value for human
capital. This ﬁrm matches with a worker whose indiﬀerence curve is
given by the dashed convex curve tangent to it. This higher type worker
has a lower cost of acquiring education, so his or her indiﬀerence curve
is ﬂatter than the marginal worker’s indiﬀerence curve.
The green segment of the hedonic line above the point e is sensible
in that if a worker considers cutting investment below the level they
are supposed to supply in equilibrium, the ﬁrm with whom they are
currently matched will be able to replace them with a worker of only
inﬁnitesimally lower quality. In equilibrium this new worker will be
happy to make the move since they will be matched in equilibrium
with a ﬁrm paying an inﬁnitesimally lower wage.
As noted above, this is not true for the marginal worker who is
supposed to make investment he in equilibrium and be matched with
a ﬁrm paying wage we. To support a hedonic equilibrium, this worker
needs to believe that if he or she cuts investment, they will be matched
with a lower wage ﬁrm. One way to support the hedonic outcome is
to have this wage give them the same expected payoﬀ as they enjoyed
in equilibrium, so the deviation is unproﬁtable. However, there is no
8ﬁrm in the market oﬀering a wage below we, so this expectation is
unjustiﬁed. Furthermore, there is no way for a ﬁrm of the lowest type
to replace this deviating worker, since all other workers have either
invested bilateral Nash, or are already matched with ﬁrms who are
paying higher wages. Similar arguments apply to ﬁrms.
4. Bayesian Equilibrium
The problem is how to modify the competitive solution to account
for this behavior in the bottom of the distribution.4
On the workers’ side of the market, the resolution is relatively straight-
forward. Imagine for a moment that the market has a ﬁnite, but po-
tentially very large number of workers competing for jobs.
Workers now play a Bayesian game to determine who matches with
whom. Suppose that workers use strategies that are monotonically
increasing functions of their types so the match that a worker makes
depends only on his rank in the realized distribution of worker types.
Suppose that ﬁrms also use a common monotonically increasing strat-
egy w. Then the equilibrium strategy for a worker of type yi should
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for every y′ ∈ Y . In these two expressions, ˜ wk:m is the realized value
of the kth order statistic of ﬁrms wages. The binomial probabilities
indicate how likely it is that the worker out-invests diﬀerent numbers
of workers on his side of the market. So the long summation is just
his expected wage. The term on the right hand side gives the same
calculation when the worker acts and invests as if his type were y′
instead of yi.
This condition ignores the possibility that the worker might like to
act in a way that is diﬀerent from every other type. This possibility





h∗. Then it isn’t possible to invest an amount that is lower than all
other types. Investing more than all other types is unproﬁtable since it
doesn’t result in any improvement in the average wage the ﬁrm earns.
It is straightforward to verify from the single crossing condition of
preferences, that the condition above will be satisﬁed if the appropriate
9ﬁrst order condition is satisﬁed for every type. This gives the diﬀeren-
tial equation
(4) h
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equation satisﬁes the appropriate Lipschitz condition because of the
fact that cyy is bounded away from zero by the strict convexity as-
sumption. By standard theorems (for example (Kreider, Kuller and
Ostberg 1968), Theorem 9-7), it has a unique (and evidently mono-
tonically increasing) solution which varies continuously (in the sense of
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parametrically traces out something that looks like a hedonic price
functional of the kind that might be estimated by a labour economist.
The exact relationship between wages and investments is driven by the
equilibrium of the Bayesian game instead of market clearing. Since the
lowest worker type makes an equilibrium investment equal to h∗, and
because the equilibrium strategy is continuous, this parametrization
associates and expected wage with every investment between h∗ and
h(y). By standard properties of the Bayesian equilibrium, the menu
of investment expected wage pairs has the property that the workers’
equilibrium strategy picks out each worker type’s favorite element of
the menu.
An analogous argument applies for ﬁrms. The common strategy
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10where the expectation refers to the expectations of the various order
statistics of workers investments when workers use their equilibrium















t (xi)(1 − F (xi))
m−1−t
This equation is easier to solve, since it gives the equation for the equi-
librium strategy in closed form conditional on the values of the expected
order statistics. Again, the boundary condition is that w(x) = w∗.
Again, the relation






maps out a simple hedonic relationship between the wage a ﬁrm oﬀers
and the expected quality of the worker it will hire in return. As the
worst ﬁrm type must always attain her equilibrium payoﬀ by oﬀering
the wage w∗, this relationship deﬁnes a menu of wage-expected quality
pairs that are available to ﬁrms when acting against the equilibrium
strategies of their opponents. The menu includes returns for all wages
between the minimum wage w∗ and the highest wage oﬀered by any
ﬁrm type.
This remedies the diﬃculty with the basic hedonic solution, which as
we have pointed out, assigns a payoﬀ in an arbitrary and unrealistic way
in order to support equilibrium. Here the payoﬀs to all investments are
computed in a sensible way, consistent with equilibrium behavior. The
hedonic solution, like all competitive solutions, is intended to apply to
large markets where individual traders have little market power. This
suggests that a good way to modify the competitive solution would be
to try to compute what this solution looks like when the number of
workers and ﬁrms is very large.
5. Equilibrium with Many Workers and Firms
The material in this section is taken from Peters (2007). Let hm
and wm be Bayesian equilibrium strategies when there are m ﬁrms
and n = τm workers. Let h∞ and w∞ refer to the weak limits of
these equilibrium strategies as m and n go to inﬁnity together.5 These
functions describe the way workers and ﬁrms respectively behave in the
limit when they face a continuum of opponents.
11Similarly, let ˆ wm (h′) deﬁne the menu given by (5) and ˆ hm (w′) the
menu given by (8). Then ˆ w∞ and ˆ h∞ deﬁne the pointwise limits of these
functions. These latter two functions represent the hedonic payoﬀs that
workers and ﬁrms respectively face in the limit when they play against
a continuum of other workers and ﬁrms.
Proposition 5.1. h∞ (y) = h∗ for each y < y0. Furthermore ˆ w∞ (h′)−
c(h′,y0) = −c(h∗,y0) for each h∗ ≤ h′ ≤ h∞ (y0).
The Proposition says that the marginal worker type y0 receives an
expected payoﬀ in the limit which is equal to his or her payoﬀ when
they are unemployed. It also says that this is true for any investment
the marginal worker makes between h∗ and h∞ (y0) .
Informally the reason relies on the fact that traders use monotonic
strategies in each ﬁnite game. So only the workers with the top m types
will get jobs. As the economy becomes large, a worker will ﬁnd himself
in this set only if his type is above y0. So workers with types below
this simply won’t invest in the limit, simply because there is no reward
to doing so. To ensure that such workers don’t want to deviate and
oﬀer something between h∗ and h∞ (y0), the expected payoﬀ function
ˆ w∞ can be no steeper than the marginal workers indiﬀerence curve on
this region.
On the other hand workers whose types are above y0 are sure to
ﬁnd jobs. To prevent the higher type workers from cutting wage, the
limit payoﬀ functions between h∗ and h∞ (y0) can be no ﬂatter than
the marginal workers indiﬀerence curve. This is the formal argument
that extends the hedonic return function outside the domain generated
by equilibrium strategies.
A similar argument applies for ﬁrms. The return function faced by
ﬁrms for wages between w∗ and w∞ (x) has to coincide with the worst
ﬁrm’s indiﬀerence curve to prevent the higher types from deviating and
oﬀering the minimum wage.
The second Proposition (again from Peters (2007)) provides much of
the characterization of the limit behavior of this matching market. For
any type y′ > y0, call x′ = π (y′) the hedonic partner of worker y′ if
the measure of the set of ﬁrms whose types are larger than x′ is equal
to the measure of the set of workers whose types are larger than y′.
Assortative matching in the continuum would require that each worker
whose type is above y0 be matched with his or her hedonic partner.
Proposition 5.2. For each y′ ≥ y0,
ˆ w∞ (h∞ (y
′)) = w∞ (π(y
′))
12A similar proposition applies for ﬁrms. The way this Proposition
is used is as follows: begin with a candidate pair of limit strategies
w∞ ( ) and h∞ ( ). We want to check whether this pair of strategies
could constitute weak limits of some sequence of Bayesian equilibrium
strategies. From Proposition 5.1, any such weak limit must have the
property that h∞ (y′) = h∗ for every worker type below y0, so lets
assume this condition is satisﬁed.
Proposition 5.2 now shows how to construct the limit payoﬀ func-
tion from the strategies h∞ and w∞. Again, using Proposition 5.1, the
payoﬀ to any investment between h∗ and h∞ (y0) is given by the graph
of the marginal worker’s indiﬀerence curve. Proposition 5.2 now says
that the payoﬀ function to each worker type in equilibrium must be
equal to the candidate strategy of his or her hedonic partner. Since a
worker can emulate the behavior of any type above y0, this deﬁnes an
implicit payoﬀ function for every investment in the range of h∞. Using
this payoﬀ function we can then compute a best reply for every worker
type. We do exactly the same thing for ﬁrms. In order for our origi-
nal candidate strategies to be the limits of equilibrium strategies from
Bayesian games, they have to coincide with these best reply functions.
Formally
Proposition 5.3. The strategy rules w∞ and h∞ are weak limits of
Bayesian equilibrium strategies only if h∞ (y′) = h∗ for y′ < y0;
h∞ (y










where ˆ h∞ (w′′) = {h∞ (π−1 (x′′));w∞(x′′) = w′′}.
Proposition 5.3 only supplies a necessary condition for equilibrium.
The element that is lacking in the Proposition is the starting value for
the function w∞. If we could tie this down, then a complete characteri-
zation of the limits of Bayesian equilibrium behavior would be possible.
What remains in this section is a heuristic description of the location
of this starting point.
If any ﬁrm oﬀers a wage equal to w∗, it will have the lowest wage
on oﬀer with probability 1. Its partner will then be the worker with
the n − m + 1st highest human capital investment. So the expected
quality is simply the expected value of the n − m + 1st order statis-
tic of worker investments. Denote the probability distribution of this
order statistic by Pr
n
˜ hn−m+1:n ≤ x
o
. Without further comment, it
13seems reasonable to assume that this distribution converges weakly to
Pr
n
˜ hn−m:n−1 ≤ x
o
as m and n go to inﬁnity.
Now consider a worker who invests some amount h∗ < h′ < h∞ (y0).
If the random variable ˜ hn−m:n−1 is more than h′, then this investment
cannot result in a match, and the worker will end up without a job.
On the other hand if ˜ hn−m:n−1 is less than h′, the worker will ﬁnd a
job. Since the limit distribution of wages doesn’t contain any wages
below w∞ (x), and since this worker can’t earn a higher wage than any
worker who invests at or above w∞ (x), the expected wage conditional
on ﬁnding a job should converge to w∞ (x).6 By Proposition 5.2, this
means that the worker’s payoﬀ conditional on ﬁnding a job is the same








By Proposition 5.1, the payoﬀ function ˆ w∞ (h′) must coincide with the












c(h∞ (y0),y0) − c(h∗,y0)
So the expected quality of the ﬁrm’s partner when it oﬀers the wage







In fact, this completes the characterization of the limits of Bayesian
equilibrium. The limit strategies must satisfy the ﬁxed point condition
described in Proposition 5.3. In addition, the point (h∞ (y0),w∞ (x))










These conditions characterize a Truncated Hedonic Equilibrium as de-
scribed in Peters (2006).
6. Truncated Hedonic Equilibrium
To relate all these limit results to hedonic equilibrium, a couple of
remarks are helpful. First, point (h∞ (y0),w∞ (x)) is focal in all this,
since the limit payoﬀ functions look very competitive for investments
and wages above these. Yet they look quite unusual below this point.
So deﬁne (h0,w0) ≡ (h∞ (y0),w∞ (x)). The construction of the limit
equilibrium hinges around this point. Next let ˆ w∞ ( ) ≡ ωt ( ). The
superscript t refers to ’truncated hedonic’, and serves to distinguish






Figure 2. Truncated Hedonic vs Hedonic Equilibrium
this idea from the simple hedonic relationship ω ( ) that was deﬁned
above.
Now we can deﬁne a Truncated Hedonic Equilibrium as a hedonic
wage relationship ωt with initial value (h0,w0) that satisﬁes
(1) for each h ≥ h0 the measure of the set {x : argmaxh′ v(x)h′ − ωt (h′) ≥ h}
is equal to the measure of the set {y : argmaxh′ {ωt (h′) − c(h′,y)} ≥ h};
(2) w0 − c(h0,y0) = −c(h∗,y0); and






∂h′ dh′ − w∗.
The ﬁrst condition is readily seen to be a reformulation of the conditions
in Proposition 5.3, the second condition is the result in Proposition 5.1.
The ﬁnal condition is the boundary condition as discussed above.
The next ﬁgure illustrates the truncated hedonic equilibrium for one
plausible speciﬁcation of preferences and compares it to the pure he-









The truncated hedonic equilibrium is the piecewise diﬀerentiable
function that starts at the point (h∗,0), follows the indiﬀerence curve
of the marginal worker y0 up to the point (h0,w0), then kinks and
travels between the indiﬀerence curves of workers and ﬁrms. If you are
viewing the paper in color, the truncated hedonic return function is the
green line. Also, to make the tangencies a little clearer, the picture is
15drawn with concave iso-proﬁt curves for ﬁrms. Formally the iso-proﬁt
curves for ﬁrms should be straight lines here. The distribution function
for the n − mth order statistic of worker investments is the marginal
worker’s indiﬀerence curve between h∗ and h0, divided by the vertical
distance w0. Taking the expectation of the order statistic using this




then determines the indiﬀerence curve for the worst
ﬁrm’s equilibrium payoﬀ.
In principle, the only restriction on the location of the point
￿
h(h0),w∗￿
is that it lie to the left of h0. It could like above or below the marginal
worker’s indiﬀerence curve. After all, the minimum wage is ﬁxed ex-
ogenously in this exercise. So simply vary this wage to get the point ￿
h(h0),w∗￿
to lie either above or below the curve. This point could
even lie on the worker’s indiﬀerence curve. It it did, a very non-robust
possibility is that the worst ﬁrm’s iso-proﬁt curve is tangent to the
marginal worker’s indiﬀerence curve at this point. If that is the case,
then the hedonic equilibrium would be supported as the limit of some
sequence of Bayesian equilibrium.




the marginal worker’s indiﬀerence curve. As the truncated hedonic re-
turn function is kinked at the point (h0,w0), a lot of diﬀerent ﬁrm and
worker types will pool at this point. It is perhaps confusing that in
a large ﬁnite Bayesian game, there is no pooling at all since invest-
ment and wage strategies are both monotonically increasing. However,
worker types near y0 all make very similar investments when there are
many workers and ﬁrms, and this looks like pooling in the limit.
Since Bayesian equilibrium ensures that even in the limit all ﬁrms
and workers are matched assortatively, the pools at (h0,w0) must have
equal measure. Types from both sides will be added to this pool un-
til the marginal types added to the pool on both sides have tangent
indiﬀerence curves. The remaining workers and ﬁrms are matched in
the manner of a competitive equilibrium. They match with wages and
investments that are bilaterally eﬃcient.
The simple hedonic (competitive) is represented by the curve that
starts at the tangency of the worst ﬁrm and marginal worker’s indif-
ference curves. The line is drawn in red if you are seeing the picture
in color. One immediate consequence is that workers and ﬁrms have
higher human capital investments and wages in a truncated hedonic
equilibrium than they do in a competitive equilibrium. One result of
this is that all ﬁrms are worse oﬀ in the truncated hedonic equilibrium
than they are in the competitive equilibrium. Further, all worker types
16above y0 are better oﬀ in the truncated hedonic equilibrium than in
the plain competitive equilibrium.
Yet the outcome is not Pareto optimal. The workers and ﬁrms pooled
together at (h0,w0) are basically enforcing the equilibrium. They don’t
want to privately reduce their wage or investment because they might
lose a match, or match with a partner whose quality is lower. However,
if they could negotiate any contract specifying the wage and human
capital investments they like, then they would mutually prefer that
lower wages be paid, and that the worker acquire less human capital. In
this regard, the anti-trust suit against the residents matching program
was misplaced - the joint competition in wages and investment results
in wages that are actually higher than they would be in a competitive
equilibrium.
The pool of workers and ﬁrms at (h0,w0) is the result of the follow-
ing kind of externality: workers human capital investment is sunk, so
if they don’t ﬁnd a job, this investment is lost. To avoid this, lower
quality workers increase their human capital investments to reduce the
unemployment probability. This creates additional unemployment risks
which induce other low quality workers to invest. This negative exter-
nality is somewhat standard. On the other side of the market, this
higher investment makes the low quality workers more attractive to
ﬁrms, who bid up wages to compete for these better workers. The
higher wages create even larger incentives for the low quality workers
to avoid unemployment, and so on.
The pool of low quality workers and ﬁrms supports a fairly com-
mon property of wage distributions, in that they are skewed to the left.
There are many workers who are paid low wages, then a tail of higher
wage workers stretches out to the right. this skewness is a direct con-
sequence of the pooling and is property that is very distinct from the
distribution implied by a competitive equilibrium, which is given in a
completely exogenous way by the distribution of types.
Finally, notice that one of the impacts of the pool at the bottom
is that it generates a much larger gap in the incomes of the employed
and the unemployed. As an aside, it might be useful to note that
assortative matching in the marriage market based on education was
the original motivation for the paper Peters and Siow (2002). This
kind of assortative matching is referred to in a recent Statistics Canada
report as“educational homogamy”. Homogamy is blamed for increasing
income inequality between families since 1970. As described above, the
incentive eﬀects of assortative matching with ex ante investment create
two sorts of inequality. The one just mentioned would lead the married
and unmarried to have very diﬀerent education levels. This gap is
17larger than it would be in a competitive equilibrium. Inequality across
families also increases, at least relative to what would occur with simple
random matching where all families would make minimal educational
investments.
7. Conclusion
Bayesian equilibria in matching problems with two sided investment
support allocations that diﬀer from straightforward hedonic equilib-
rium because of the way they treat payoﬀs to out of equilibrium in-
vestments. These equilibrium allocations support larger wages and in-
vestments than simple hedonic equilibria. In fact, for the lowest types
of workers and ﬁrms, these investments and wages are both too high
in the sense that any matched pair would jointly beneﬁt by lowering
both. The long side of the market beneﬁts (relative to the competitive
equilibrium).
The model is very specialized in the sense that matching is assor-
tative. Most interesting matching problems involve much more com-
plex characteristics for workers and ﬁrms and allow the possibility that
traders on one side of the market might disagree about how to rank
the traders on the other side. A very general existence theorem for
hedonic equilibrium exists when preferences are quasi-linear. Absent
quasi-linearity, existence theorems exist only for special cases (for ex-
ample, Peters and Siow (2002)).
Truncated hedonic equilibrium has only been deﬁned as an equilib-
rium for a large game with assortative matching. It isn’t clear to what
extent the considerations here will impact investments in more com-
plex problems where characteristics are high dimensional and traders
disagree about how to rank partners. It seems reasonable to conjec-
ture that the problems with hedonic equilibrium will become worse
with higher dimensional characteristics. The basic logic is that the
worst worker who expects to be employed is considerably better for
the ﬁrm with whom he matches than the next best alternative who
has no investment at all because he never expected to compete for a
job. With multi-dimensional characteristics, there are many market
edges like this. A ﬁrm who is forced in equilibrium to match with his
least desirable worker in one dimension may ﬁnd that the next best
alternative for him varies in many diﬀerent characteristics. If this al-
ternative is strictly worse that the worker who he is supposed to hire
in equilibrium, the worker may know this and cut investment.
18The simple assortative matching case nonetheless illustrates some-
thing quite unsettling about stable matching. It can have very bad in-
centive properties. The focus on stable matching algorithms as a good
way of organizing matching problems like residents matching may be
misguided. The results here suggest that the anti-trust case directed at
the deferred acceptance algorithm might have missed the mark. Wages
are higher than they are in a completely competitive market. However,
incentive would be improved with matching procedures that could com-
mit to unstable outcomes, especially in oﬀ equilibrium situations. For
example, a fully eﬃcient outcome could be supported simply by impos-
ing a lower level on investment, then committing to leave participants
with characteristics below this level unmatched, which would typically
not be stable.
19Notes
1In the Felli Roberts argument, ﬁrms must bid for workers ex post,
so there is potentially a way for ﬁrms to penalize workers who cut
investment below the eﬃcient level. Their argument goes as follows:
the worst ﬁrm has to pay the worst (employed) worker just enough to
keep him from jumping to his next best alternative, which for the worst
worker is unemployment. When this worker chooses his investment,
the return he gets is his personal beneﬁt when he is unemployed, not
the marginal beneﬁt of the investment to the ﬁrm. So his investment
incentives are wrong. So eﬃcient investments unravel from the bottom
in their story as well.
2More generally, the hedonic pricing problem allows the characteris-
tic that the ﬁrm chooses, h in this case, to be drawn from a much larger
dimensional space. However, the hedonic pricing problem doesn’t allow
the dimension of the worker’s characteristic to be higher than 1 - the
worker always pays money for the diﬀerent qualities of good.
3The ’price’ of capital in this story is normalized to 1. This wouldn’t
work if the characteristic chosen by ﬁrms was of high dimension. The
hedonic pricing equilibrium can still be deﬁned, but the pricing function
would have to a more general non-linear functional of investment.
4The proofs and technical details for all of the arguments that follow
are given in the papers Peters (2004), Peters (2006) and Peters (2007).
5The weak limit of a function is equal to its pointwise limit at every
point where this limiting function is continuous. The existence of a
weak limit is guaranteed by the fact that the functions hm and wm are
always increasing, and the fact that their domains are contained in a
bounded interval.
6It is only possible (at least for me) to prove that this conditional
expected wage is bounded above by w∞ (x). This is the formal dif-
ference between strict limits of Bayesian equilibrium as described in
Peters (2007) and Truncated Hedonic Equilibrium as described in Pe-
ters (2006).
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